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Abstract
FDI from the European Union (EU) ranks before FDI from North America (NA)
in some of the Latin American countries. We investigate the impact of EU- versus
NA-FDI on the growth rate including about 50 controls. Country speciﬁc eﬀects and
parameter heterogeneity are incorporated in our estimation. We use Bayesian Model
Averaging to address model uncertainty and to select the best models and most ro-
bust parameters. Our results indicate that positive eﬀects of FDI are dependent on
the functioning of legal frameworks and the quality of infrastructure. EU-FDI is an
important, robust growth determinant whereas NA-FDI is not.
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The EU has become the largest direct investor ahead of North America (NA) in some of
the Latin American (LA) countries, especially in South America.1 Due to the negative
experiences with their earlier import substitution development strategies, LA countries
consider the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a key strategy to promote
growth and development since the 1990s. At the end of this decade more than 80 per
cent of the net private capital ﬂows into the region have been FDI.2 This raises several
questions: To what extent can FDI ﬂows into LA actually contribute to growth? Which
conditions must be met for FDI to be beneﬁcial for growth? Are growth eﬀects diﬀerent if
source countries diﬀer, in particular, does it make a diﬀerence if FDI comes from the EU
compared to NA?
The theoretical literature proposes a number of arguments for FDI having a positive im-
pact on growth. The starting point is commonly an endogenous growth model in which
FDI receives a special role in raising technology levels. First, FDI is considered to act as
main channel for international technology transfers increasing the productivity of the host
country. Second, foreign ﬁrms are supposed to increase competition and, thus, inducing
local ﬁrms to become more productive. Third, foreign ﬁrms are assumed to invest in
training of the work force thereby improving qualiﬁcations in the country.3
Contrary to the extensive literature on FDI eﬀects in other developing and transition
countries, there are only few studies having investigated the FDI-growth nexus for LA. In
our opinion, two major drawbacks are related to these studies. First, it is not possible to
draw clear conclusions from them due to the varying methods, model speciﬁcations and
country samples used. Second, these studies neither consider diﬀerent source countries in
general nor EU- versus NA-FDI in particular. First evidence, however, suggests that the
pattern and motivation of EU-FDI – hence, most likely also its impact on the host country
– diﬀer from those of NA. While EU companies heavily invested in public utilities and the
service sector through acquisitions, NA investment focused on greenﬁeld investment in the
manufacturing sector.
Several studies analyzed the connection of GDP growth and FDI inﬂows. A positive rela-
tion was early established in studies for Mexico (e.g. Blomstr¨ om and Wolf 1994). Cuadros
et al. (2004) performed Granger causality tests between FDI and growth for Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico 1975-1997. Looking at 1970-1990 and performing a time series analy-
sis and vector autoregressions (VAR), De Mello and Fukasaku (2000) also ﬁnd a positive
1See, for example, UNCTAD 2004; Vodusek 2004.
2Levy Yegati et al. 2007.
3Borensztein et al. 1998.
1eﬀect of FDI on GDP growth for Mexico and Venezuela but have to reject such an eﬀect
for Chile and Brazil. Nor do ﬁnd Heo and De Rouen (2002) clear evidence for a positive
growth impact of US-FDI in LA in a similar VAR analysis for 1950-1998. In contrast,
Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) estimate the impact of FDI on growth in a panel data
model and propose a positive eﬀect of FDI on growth in their study on 18 LA countries.
This paper analyzes the growth eﬀects of FDI in 17 LA countries in the period 1985-2003.
In contrast to earlier studies that only investigated fairly general conditional factors, we
look at speciﬁc indicators capturing infrastructure and human capital conditions as well
as the institutional, structural and macroeconomic environment for FDI in LA. We ﬁrst
analyze total FDI inﬂows but then distinguish between NA- and EU-FDI allowing also for
parameter heterogeneity between diﬀerent groups of LA countries (the rich, the big and
the South American economies as opposed to the rest).
A problem inherent in empirical growth research is model and parameter uncertainty, that
is, uncertainty about the correct model and about which explanatory variables to include
exactly in the growth regression. It roots in lacking theoretical guidance due to the ‘ope-
nendedness’ of growth theory and necessitates a framework being capable of incorporating
these uncertainties in a statistically rigorous way. Therefore, we use BMA which was ﬁrst
proposed in the growth context by Fern´ andez, Ley and Steel (henceforth FLS) (2001a).
It draws inference based on a weighted average of all available models instead of on the
basis of one a priori chosen model that is supposed to be the ‘true’ one.4
This paper extends the seminal work of FLS (2001a) to a panel framework. BMA en-
dogenously determines a ranking in terms of explanatory power of all our variables and
models which is why our results are highly reliable as they are not derived conditional on
a special model but based only on very robust regressors. We ﬁnd a strong and positive
growth impact of total FDI when it interacts with rule of law and tertiary education.
Distinguishing between source countries we ﬁnd only EU-FDI to be an important growth
factor in LA if it meets low political risk and a sound legal framework. In contrast, we
cannot ﬁnd a robust impact of NA-FDI. Generally, institutions, infrastructure and human
capital, especially tertiary education, play an important role in our growth regressions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our hypotheses and speciﬁes the
model. Section 3 describes the large set of variables and their sources. Section 4 describes
the methodology and discusses econometric issues. Section 5 presents the results while
section 6 concludes.
4See Hoeting et al. (1999) for a general overview on the methodology. For a recent survey on the
econometric problems of standard cross-country growth regressions see, for example, Durlauf et al. (2005).
The need for Bayesian approaches is emphasized, among others, in Brock and Durlauf (2001), Brock et al.
(2003), Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2004) or Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).
22 Hypotheses and Model Speciﬁcation
While growth was high in LA in the 1960 and 1970s, it faded after the debt crisis of the
early 1980s. The period entered as Latin America’s lost decade in economic history. Then
economic reforms were initiated aiming at less government intervention, more liberalization
and macroeconomic stabilization in line with the Washington consensus. Finally, growth
gained momentum since the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the region suﬀered a
number of crises, such as Mexico in 1994/95, Brazil in 1999 and Argentina in 2001.5
Economic liberalization also entailed an opening towards FDI. LA countries and their rep-
resentative international institutions like the UN commission for LA and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) increasingly considered the
attraction of FDI as key strategy to promote growth and development. Therefore, the to-
tal stock of FDI in LA rose steeply with a growth rate of around 30 per cent per year since
the mid 1990s.6 In countries like Bolivia and Chile FDI reached more than 50 per cent of
GDP from the end of the 90’s onwards and steeply increasing up to 70 per cent or more.
In countries like Ecuador, Nicaragua or Venezuela the FDI/GDP share is approaching
50 per cent and, generally speaking, it is still steadily increasing in all LA countries (see
Figure 1 in the appendix). While NA investment traditionally played an important role
in LA, EU-FDI surpassed NA-FDI stocks in South America in the 1990s. Since then it
dominates in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru whereas NA-FDI
is still most important in Mexico and Central America (see Figures 2-5 in the Appendix).
Why should FDI stimulate growth and development? The starting point is commonly
the notion that FDI receives a special role in raising the technology level. First, FDI is
considered to act as a main channel for international technology transfer. Multinationals
operate with superior technologies and managerial practices, which increase productiv-
ity in the industry of the host country. Second, the entry of foreign ﬁrms increases the
competition level in the branch that should lead to an increase of productivity of local
ﬁrms. Third, foreign ﬁrms establish linkages with upstream and downstream ﬁrms and
will thereby transfer technological know-how to them as well. Another channel of spillover
eﬀects of foreign ﬁrms will act through the labor market (Aitken et al. 1997, Blomstr¨ om
and Kokko 1997, Borensztein et al. 1998).
Empirical studies testing the growth impact of the level of FDI stocks per se largely re-
main inconclusive. However, some literature appeared which proposed the growth eﬀect
is subject to certain conditions in the country of destination. Borensztein et al. (1998)
show that FDI only has a positive impact on growth if a country possesses a suﬃcient
5Corbo et al. 2005.
6Levy Yegati et al. 2007, p. 105
3level of human capital. Carkovic and Levine (2002) test whether human capital and the
income level of an economy determine the growth impact of FDI while Castej´ on and W¨ orz,
(2006) look at the openness of an economy as a condition for the growth eﬀect of FDI.
We consider that there are many more factors that may be critical for the growth impact
of FDI. Therefore, in contrast to earlier studies looking at fairly rough general indicators
as conditional factors for FDI, we shall investigate the impact of FDI conditioned on a
variety of very speciﬁc factors, which will be described below.
This study also distinguishes between diﬀerent source countries of FDI as the impact of
EU-FDI may diﬀer from that of NA-FDI since the motives for FDI, its nature and type
as well as the investment sectors diﬀer between EU and NA investors. Starting from these
ﬁrst insights on FDI provided by European and North American investors to what extent
could the source region then make a diﬀerence for growth eﬀects of FDI to arise?
Note that the aggregate productivity eﬀect on the macro level is the sum of several eﬀects,
namely productivity increases within the ﬁrm, horizontal productivity eﬀects through
increased competition and labor mobility to competing ﬁrms and, ﬁnally, productivity
spillovers through forward and backward linkages (Rodriguez Clare 1996, Markusen and
Venables 1999). The extent of these productivity eﬀects depends (i) on the way in which
foreign investment is provided (greenﬁeld FDI versus mergers and acquisitions), (ii) the
type of FDI (market seeking/horizontal FDI versus vertical FDI) which often is related
to the distance of the source country and the applicability of free trade regimes and (iii)
and the sector of investment. Obviously it makes a diﬀerence whether FDI takes place as
greenﬁeld investment or through mergers and acquisitions. While greenﬁeld investment
usually introduces more advanced technologies in the new production site and thus pro-
vides a substantial direct productivity eﬀect, it is less likely to source locally and thus
produces less spillover eﬀects to backward industries. These spillovers are more provided
in the case of mergers and acquisitions where the supplier relations of the acquired ﬁrm
are kept (Javorcik 2004, Javorcik and Spatareanu 2006). Second, vertical FDI, where just
a stage in the production is transferred to the host country to beneﬁt from cost advantages
and where commonly the supplies are imported from the source country, will not generate
spillover eﬀects on the local industry. The beneﬁt of this FDI remains limited to a direct
productivity eﬀect and the provision of additional production capacity oﬀering employ-
ment. In contrast, with horizontal FDI, the entire production process of a product is
placed in the host country. This not only provides for a direct productivity eﬀect through
advanced technologies and the upgrading of a multitude of skills, but it also provides for
large productivity spillovers since a large number of intermediary products need to be
purchased, mostly locally. Geographically close partner countries and labor costs diﬀer-
4entials promote vertical FDI. The existence of a free trade regime between the partners
will further boost vertical FDI. Examples are found in the Eastern European transition
countries and in Mexico, which are both close to a rich neighbor and linked by a free
trade arrangement. Javorcik et al. (2004) have shown that distance to the source country
and the applicability of free trade results in diﬀerent types of investment and spillovers
in Eastern Europe. While close EU investors, subject to free trade, did not provide for
local spillovers when investing in Rumania because they did not source locally, US-FDI
which did not beneﬁt of free trade for home supplies and were home imports would also
involve high transport costs, generated productivity spillovers. Similarly, we may expect
that EU-FDI in Latin America should in general be market seeking because home markets
are too distant for vertical FDI and the extent of free trade between the EU and Latin
American countries is very limited. In contrast, for North American investors Latin Amer-
ican countries are close production sites and free trade regimes are partly well established,
e.g. with Mexico and Central America. We would therefore expect that vertical FDI dom-
inates with NA-FDI. Third, investment in the manufacturing sector is likely to generate
more spillover eﬀects to the local economy through linkages than investment in the pri-
mary sector such as mining which uses imported capital goods and operates rather isolated
(Alfaro and Rodriguez Clare 2003). Furthermore, FDI in the in the service sector subject
to privatization processes improves the eﬃciency of local infrastructure such as telecom-
munication and ﬁnancial services and consequently enables more productivity gains from
FDI in manufacturing (Arnold et al. 2006). Consequently, the important participation
of European investors in service markets liberalization in Latin American countries would
have a high potential to generate productivity eﬀects. In summary, there is good reason
to suppose EU- and NA-FDI would yield diﬀerent productivity eﬀects in LA.
The lack of robust results on the growth impact of FDI in previous studies is also likely to
be attributed to diﬀerent indicators for FDI, econometric problems and unreliable data.
First, using FDI data one needs to be aware of potential problems arising in the data.
According to the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual, which is the principal framework
for collecting FDI data, FDI data should include the components equity capital, reinvested
earning and intra-ﬁrm loans. However, particularly the latter two categories may not be
reported properly. Furthermore, while the IMF recommends indication of FDI stocks on a
market value basis, in practice, ﬁrms report FDI stocks from ﬁrm balance sheets that are
often measured at historical costs (Duce 2003). Our principal source of FDI stock data
is UNCTAD. FDI stocks from the EU and the NA were compiled from several additional
sources as explained in Table A.2.2 in the appendix. Although data for our FDI variables
was compiled with much care, one needs to be aware of remaining data uncertainties.
5Second, there is a debate of whether to use FDI stocks or FDI ﬂows. It is argued that
working with stocks can avoid endogeneity problems and that it is the total stock of FDI
which constitutes the basis to generate technology spillovers. Furthermore, stock data are
more stable than FDI ﬂows where a major investment in one year can lead to extreme
values. However, particularly in transition countries and developing countries FDI stock
data may contain unit roots. This is also the case with EU- and NA-FDI in LA. There-
fore, we have to use FDI ﬂows being aware that there may be endogeneity problems. In
an economic sense it can be argued that the FDI growth nexus can work via FDI ﬂows
since it is the latest capital which is responsible for generating productivity gains. Third,
FDI growth regressions are likely to be haunted by a number of econometric problems.
One of these is certainly the endogeneity bias caused by the use of FDI ﬂows. As a rem-
edy, Carkovic and Levine (2002) employ a GMM framework and Stehrer and W¨ orz (2005)
estimate a system of simultaneous equations.
In our BMA model, we investigate a number of potential growth factors and conditional
variables for FDI. We use a panel data growth regression model with country speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects as the starting point for our BMA. In this model productivity growth 4yit
is explained by gross ﬁxed capital formation invit, a number of human capital variables
contained in matrix HCit, some macroeconomic variables in matrix MACROit, a few infras-
tructure variables in matrix INFRAit, diﬀerent institutional variables in matrix INSTit,
some structural variables in matrix STRUCit and many interaction terms of FDI with
human capital, infrastructure and institutional variables.
4yit = αi + β1INVit + β2HCit + β3FDIit + β4MACROit + β5INFRAit + β6INSTit+
β7STRUCit + β8FDIitHCit + β9FDIitINFRAit + β10FDIitINSTit + εit (1)
We include 17 LA countries in our analysis, i.e. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. The time period considered ranges from 1985 to
2003.
As endogenous growth theory suggests, we should assume that the availability of human
capital in LA plays an important role for growth. Therefore, we test the impact of the lit-
eracy rate and of educational attainment in primary, secondary and tertiary education. In
all countries the literacy rate and the tertiary education attainment rate in the population
increased over the whole period considered. As argued in the human capital literature (for
a survey, see Temple 2001), we use attainment rates and not enrolment rates since our
data conﬁrms that enrolment rates are too volatile and therefore likely to yield unreliable
estimation results. Nevertheless, since our data comes from the Barro/Lee (2000) data
6set, which reports ﬁgures in 5-year intervals, we have to consider that the data do not
represent the exact development of attainment rates but rather their rough development
path.
One by one the LA countries the started a reform process after the debt crisis. Policies to
foster macroeconomic stability formed the core. Countries started to combat their ﬁscal
deﬁcits without, however, achieving sustainable advance in that ﬁeld (e.g. Brazil, Ar-
gentina and Mexico faced ﬁscal policy problems repeatedly in the past decade; Corbo et
al. 2005). The accumulation of debt was accompanied by high interest rates. The external
debt ratio (in terms of exports) went down since the mid 1980s, but there is still a wide
spread between countries like Argentina with a debt ratio amounting to 5 times of its
exports by 2000, Brazil where the debt ratio accounts 3 times the export level and Chile
and Mexico where it accounts for 200 per cent and 100 per cent of exports, respectively.
The inability of countries to manage inﬂation constituted another serious macroeconomic
problem. Several countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru suﬀered hyperin-
ﬂation before or shortly after 1990 (Corbo et al. 2005). High inﬂation also means that
inﬂation rates may become very volatile what can be observed in the LA hyperinﬂation
countries. High inﬂation and high inﬂation volatility increase uncertainty and seriously
worsen the business climate. A number of LA currencies drastically devalued during the
1980s and early 1990s (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua). Over the 1990s the
exchange rate index became much more stable. Exchange rate volatility decreased in the
1990s. Decreasing exchange rate volatility reduces the risk premium for investments and
leads to more stable terms of trade.
Consequently, the reduction of debt, the decrease in inﬂation volatility and the decrease
in exchange rate volatility should lead to a more stable business environment and there-
fore higher growth rates. The importance of stable macroeconomic variables such as low
inﬂation and low budget deﬁcits was veriﬁed in previous growth studies (e.g. Dollar and
Burnside 1999) for developing countries. To test the impact of improved macroeconomic
stability we concentrate on the mentioned indicators debt to export ratio, inﬂation volatil-
ity and exchange rate volatility. We cannot consider budget deﬁcits and interest rate
diﬀerentials due to inconsistent deﬁnitions across countries and too short time series.
Recent empirical growth research, e.g. Barro (1996), Rodrik et al. (2002) and Easterly
and Levine (2003), found that the quality of institutions is an important prerequisite
for growth. Low political risk, absence of corruption, rule of law and bureaucratic ef-
ﬁciency build a safer business environment and guarantee better economic policies and,
thus, enable higher growth rates. With respect to LA, Corbo et al. (2005) examine the
institutional quality in the large LA countries using the Index of Economic Freedom pub-
7lished by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Larson 2005). This index considers the size
of government, security of property rights and legal situation. According to these authors,
institutional quality partly improved in LA with Chile being the most advanced country
in this respect. Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) estimate the impact of FDI on LA
growth and consider as well the composite economic freedom index of the Fraser Institute.
They ﬁnd that growth is signiﬁcantly positively related to the economic freedom index.
Unfortunately, the single items of the freedom index, like corruption, property rights, etc.
are not available for LA.
In our opinion it is important to distinguish between single aspects of institutional qual-
ity rather then to look at a composite index, though, we use institutional data from the
International Country Risk Guide, which provides this detailed data. Hence we can con-
sider government stability, democratic accountability, bureaucratic quality, corruption, law
and order, military in politics and political risk in general as factors potentially aﬀecting
growth. Indeed, an exploratory correlation analysis showed that there is no high correla-
tion between these diﬀerent institutional subcategories in LA. Government stability largely
improved in LA in the 1990s, but fell in the early 2000s. Political risk diminished as well
in the 1990s but increased thereafter. The involvement of military in politics decreased in
the second part of the 1980s, but increased again with some countries in the 1990s. The
extent of internal conﬂicts (violence, civil disorder) largely improved until the mid 1990s,
but deteriorated by the late 1990s and in the early 2000s. Democratic accountability and
law and order improved in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. However, bureaucratic quality and
corruption oscillated between improvement and deterioration. Despite a general trend of
improvement there is, however, much variation across countries and numerous interrup-
tions occurred. Therefore, we should expect that the development of various institutional
variables in LA indeed explains diﬀerences in growth.
We do not only consider institutional variables per se in our regressions but will also
test their signiﬁcance as a complementary factor for FDI. Therefore, we build interaction
terms of all institutional variables with FDI. Why should institutional factors be critical
for the eﬀect of FDI? If a foreign investor can rely on an eﬃcient public administration
(bureaucratic quality), low corruption and an enforceable legal system, he can implement
projects faster and will safe time and resources. Therefore, investment meeting good in-
stitutional factors will contribute more to productivity growth than investment meeting
poor institutions. Moreover, FDI meeting high political risk and political instability will
more often produce failed projects due to an uncertain environment and will therefore have
lower productivity eﬀects. Whether democracy or military in politics is important for the
growth impact of FDI is questionable. Democracy as well as military governments may
8improve the reliability of government decisions and would, thus, produce a safer business
environment which can boost the growth impact of FDI. However, military governments
may also produce less predictable business environments.
The eﬀect of public investment in infrastructure on growth and development has received
much attention since the work of Aschauer (1989). A number of papers proposed public
infrastructure to play an important role for development. For example, in the context
of the European Union’s regional policy, where infrastructure investment is a key policy
concern to improve the attractiveness and economic potential of a location, De la Fuente
(2002) found that infrastructure made an important contribution to development in Spain.
Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2004b) investigated the growth impact of infrastructure in a sample
of 121 countries in the period 1960-2000 and found that the stock of infrastructure as
well as its quality and single items such as infrastructure in roads, telecommunication and
electric power have a positive impact on growth. Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2004a) show that
infrastructure endowments of LA lag behind other middle-income countries and that their
development suﬀered from the retrenchment of public budgets since the mid 1980s.
Looking at various infrastructure components we ﬁnd that the road network and electric-
ity generating capacity in LA has in general grown modestly, but stagnated in several
countries. Telecommunication service, measured by the number of telephone mainlines
per 1000 persons steeply increased since the late 1980s. Aircraft departures per 1000 per-
sons declined in many LA countries in the second part of the 1980s, increased in the ﬁrst
half of the 1990s and declined again thereafter. The pattern is not likely to be caused by
ﬂuctuations of business cycles since it does not coincide with those and since we ﬁnd a
general increase or decline over the whole period in the rest of LA. Strikingly, we ﬁnd a
considerable variation in all infrastructure variables across countries. Therefore, we won-
der whether diﬀerent endowments in infrastructure matter for growth of LA.
In addition to contributing independently to growth, infrastructure is likely to be a condi-
tional factor for FDI to produce growth eﬀects. A good infrastructure can be considered
as a complement for FDI. If FDI meets a poor telecommunication infrastructure, poor
transport and unreliable electricity provision, it may not produce a high productivity im-
pact. The eﬀect of FDI conditioned on infrastructure variables is modeled with interaction
terms. Finally, we consider a number of structural variables as growth factors such as GDP
share of agriculture and manufacturing, composition of exports and level of urbanization.
Consequently, we investigate novel hypotheses in several respects. We look at the eﬀect of
diﬀerent institutional factors, rather than a composite institutional index. We distinguish
between diﬀerent origins of FDI considering that there might be a diﬀerence between FDI
originating from Europe or NA. We investigate the eﬀect of FDI not only under the con-
9dition of diﬀerent levels of human capital but also subject to infrastructure conditions and
institutional factors.
3 Data Deﬁnitions and Sources
Table A.2.1 in the appendix contains the list of included variables, their deﬁnition and a
detailed description of sources and compilations. We start with FDI outward stock data
because data series can be better extrapolated for stocks than for ﬂows. UNCTAD and
OECD serve as principal sources. To complete the series FDI outward stock data is also
taken from US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Statistics Canada, Deutsche Bundesbank,
Banque de France, Bank of England, Swedish Rijksbank, Swiss National Bank and De
Nederlands Bank. Additionally, we use FDI inward stock from LA central banks and
statistical oﬃces (Bolivia Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Chile Investment Committee,
Banco de la Republica Colombia, Central Bank of Costa Rica, Central Reserve Bank El
Salvador, Mexico Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Honduras Central Bank, Nicaragua
Central Bank).
In many cases the level of FDI from diﬀerent sources did not correspond. In this case
the level of the principal source was maintained while using the ﬂuctuations of the second
source. Sometimes stock data had to be generated from ﬂow data, which is legitimate
considering that many central banks themselves compile stocks in this fashion. The total
FDI stock for the EU was calculated from the sum of European countries and the one for
NA from the sum of the US and Canada. Note that the respective European countries
may vary from one LA country to another since not all European countries are present in
all LA countries (e.g. Portugal invests practically only Brazil). EU investment is slightly
underestimated since there is no data for small investors.
4 Methodology
4.1 Motivation
Since the seminal work of Barro (1991) empirical research on the determinants of economic
growth has identiﬁed numerous variables as being correlated with the growth rate. Durlauf
et al. (2005) list more than 140 potential right hand side variables for growth regressions
in their appendix coming from 44 broader areas such as education, ﬁnance, government or
trade. Taking into account the limited number of observations on a national level, growth
regressions are exposed to severe criticism based on the inherent model uncertainty. More-
over, empirical work should address the crucial problem of variable selection in setting up
10an empirical model for estimation as omitted variables can create spurious relations, while
inclusion of irrelevant variables can bias the results of an estimate. Theory sometimes can
support choices of some variables whereas the exact decision on inclusion or exclusion of
variables mostly will be arbitrary. This fundamental model uncertainty results in a wide
set of possible model speciﬁcations and, frequently, contradictory conclusions. Besides, the
results are often not robust to (minor) changes in model speciﬁcation yielding uncertainty
in valid interpretations of the results.
The lacking theoretical guidance has led to the increasing use of Bayesian methods to
deal with parameter and model uncertainty within a formal framework.7 Bayesian econo-
metrics is of particular beneﬁt for model averaging since classical econometrics does not
treat models as random variables and, thus, the concept of averaging over models cannot
be given a rigorous statistical foundation. There are, however, various ad hoc classi-
cal methods of model averaging, for example, Levine and Renelt (1992) using Leamer’s
(1983, 1985) extreme-bounds analysis (EBA) or Sala-i-Martin (1997), who attenuated the
extreme criteria for variables as being robust or non-robust regressors. EBA deﬁnes an
upper extreme bound and a lower extreme bound based on the regression coeﬃcient, β, and
its standard deviation, σ. The extreme bounds test for a variable says that if the value of
the lower extreme bound is negative and the upper one is positive, then the variable is not
robust. So, if one ﬁnds a single regression for which the sign of the coeﬃcient changes or
becomes insigniﬁcant, then the variable is not robust. Sala-i-Martin (1997) assigns ”some
level of conﬁdence to each of the variables”(p. 179) to avoid the strict zero-one labeling of
variables as being robust or not. Both approaches are preferable to using only one model
for a growth regression. Nevertheless, they do not address the uncertainty about the true
model entirely as each of those methods keeps certain variables constant in every model
and changes only part of the regressors.
On the contrary, BMA does not require selecting any subset of the regressors a priori
or ﬁxing any variables as ’base-line’ regressors. All inference is averaged over all possi-
ble combinations of regressors, that is over all models, using the corresponding posterior
model probabilities (PMPs) as weights. First, given a set of potential explanatory vari-
ables, BMA separately identiﬁes models that are expedient to explain growth by allowing
for any subset of the explanatory variables to combine in a regression and to estimate
7Another slightly diﬀerent approach than BMA is the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates
(BACE) framework proposed by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004). Due to the fact that this
method combines Bayesian with classical estimation techniques, it abandons the ’truly Bayesian’ frame-
work of proper, informative priors. As we are highly aware of the caveats related to this abandonment (see
discussion in section 4.2), we prefer using BMA. For more information on BACE, the interested reader is
referred to that literature.
11the posterior probability of any such combination of regressors. Second, conditional on
the posterior model probabilities, the issue of model uncertainty concerning the most ef-
ﬁcient means of stimulating economic growth can be resolved by estimating the posterior
probabilities of all possible explanatory variables commonly used.
4.2 BMA
Within the Bayesian framework, one can handle model uncertainty automatically by not
choosing a special model but simply averaging the results over all models using PMPs
as weights. Alternative models Mj, with j = 1,...,J, will be deﬁned through the set
of K regressors they include. They are all linear regression models that diﬀer in their
explanatory variables and contain country-speciﬁc intercepts, αiιT. It is assumed that the
individual eﬀects enter in all models and so the number of possible models is 2K. We
have data for N countries and T periods. The dependent variables for all agents and all
models are grouped in vector y of length NT, the explanatory variables and the N dummy
variables for each country are stacked in a design matrix X of dimension NT x K+N and
β is deﬁned as the full K+N-dimensional vector of regression coeﬃcients and individual
eﬀects.
Any model Mj with T observations for agent i is represented by:
yi = αiιT + X
j
i βj + εi (2)
where X
j
i is the T x kj submatrix of regressors of model Mj and βj is the k vector of
slope coeﬃcients common to all models, βj  Rkj
(0 ≤ kj ≤ K). ιT is a column vector
of T ones and εi is the T x 1 error vector that is normal, with covariance matrix σ2IT,
not autocorrelated and independent of X
j
i ,αi and βj. Thus X
j
i is strictly exogenous with
respect to εi given αi. Although normality is not necessary for consistency, it guarantees
good ﬁnite sample properties (FLS 2001b). The eﬀect of variables not contained in Xj is
assumed to be zero.
By averaging over all models the marginal posterior probability of including a certain
variable is simply the sum of the posterior probabilities of all models containing this
variable. Formally, the posterior distribution of any quantity of interest, say θj(= βj,σ,αi),
is an average of the posterior distributions of that quantity under each of the models with
weights given by the PMPs:
p(θj | yi) =
2K X
j=1
p(θj | yi,Mj) p(Mj | yi) (3)
This procedure is typically referred to as BMA and it follows from direct application of
Bayes’ theorem (Leamer 1978). P(θj | yi,Mj), the posterior distribution of θj under
12model Mj, is typically of standard form. However, we have to compute the PMPs due to
model uncertainty. Using the standard way in this case and allocating equal prior model
probabilities, this yields
p(Mj | yi) =
p(yi | Mj)
P2K
i=1 p(yi | Mi)
(4)
where p(yi | Mj) is the marginal likelihood of Model Mj. This is given by
p(yi | Mj) =
Z
p(yi | αi,βj,σ,Mj) p(αi) p(σ) p(βj | αi,σ,Mj)dαi dβj dσ (5)
with p(yi | αi,βj,σ,Mj) the sampling model corresponding to equation (1) and p(α)i, p(σ)
and p(βj | αi,σ,Mj) the priors deﬁned below in equations (6) and (7). Since marginal
likelihoods can be derived analytically8, the same holds for the PMP given in (3) and the
distribution given in (2).
In practice, however, computing the relevant posterior distributions is still subject to chal-
lenges as the number of models to be estimated increases with the number of regressors at
the rate 2K. Furthermore, the derivation of the integrals implicit in (4) may be diﬃcult
because the integrals may not exist in closed form. As we have a minimum number of 51
possible regressors, we would need to calculate the posterior probabilities for each of the
in this case 251 models and average the required distributions over all these models. Given
these diﬃculties, we will approximate the posterior distribution on the model space M by
simulating a sample from it, applying the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composition
(MC3) methodology by Madigan and York (1995) described in section 5.3.
The Bayesian framework needs to be completed with prior distributions for the parame-
ters in each model Mj which are αi,βj and the scale parameter σ. While the inclusion
of prior information is a particular feature of Bayesian inference, in the context of model
uncertainty the choice of these distributions can have substantial impact on the PMPs.
Furthermore, in a context where there are many potential explanatory variables, but one
cannot be sure about which ones to include, this prior information is rare. Accordingly,
non-informative priors would be preferable. However, PMPs cannot be meaningfully cal-
culated with improper non-informative priors for parameters that are not common for all
models. Thus, many researchers have attempted to develop proper priors which can be
automatically used without requiring subjective input or ﬁne tuning for each individual
model. Therefore, we use benchmark priors developed in FLS (2001b) that have little
inﬂuence on posterior inference as the incorporation of substantive prior information is
not necessary. If we take the {αi} to be independently uniformly distributed on the real
8For the cross-section case with demeaned regressors, FLS (2001a) derive it in their equation (8), on p.
566.
13line and adopt a default uniform prior for the scale parameter common to all models, the
prior is
p(α,σ) ∝ σ−1 (6)
With this assumption our regression now resembles the Bayesian analysis of the simplest
normal linear model with K +N regression parameters. This prior implies that all values
of α and of σ for ln(σ) are given equal prior weight. Furthermore, this distribution is
the only one that is invariant under scale transformations as for example a change in the
measurement units.
For βj we choose an informative g-prior structure according to FLS (2001b)9
p(βj | α,σ,Mj) ∼ N(0,σ2[gjX0jXj]−1) (7)
It is common practice to center priors over the hypothesis that explanatory variables have
no eﬀect on the dependent variable, especially when there are many regressors but it is
suspected that many of them may be irrelevant. Therefore, we set the mean of βj = 0.











As we have to deal not only with parameter but as well with model uncertainty, we
need to choose a prior distribution over the space M of all 2K possible models. Follow-
ing the standard practice for BMA in linear regression models, especially in the context
of economic growth (FLS 2001a; Masanjala and Papageorgiou 2004; Leon-Gonzalez and
Montolio 2004), we allocate equal prior model probability to each model and set
p(Mj) = 2−K (9)
This yields a uniform distribution on the model space which implies that the prior proba-
bility of including a regressor is 1
2, independently of the combination of regressors included
in the model.10
9This prior is slightly unusual as it depends upon X
j
i , the regressor matrix. However, as we are later
conditioning on X
j
i in likelihood function and posterior as well, we are not violating any rule of probability
by conditioning on X
j
i in the prior already.
10Some authors recommend diﬀerent choices for p(Mj). For instance, many researchers prefer parsimony
and feel that simpler models should be preferred to more complex ones, all else being equal. In contrast,
Durlauf et al. (2005) argue against priors promoting parsimonious models that the underlying ”presumption
is unappealing as our own prior beliefs suggest that the true growth model is likely to contain many distinct
factors” (p. 83). Moreover, regular posterior odds ratios already include a reward for parsimony and the
144.3 Implementation
In Bayesian econometrics, models are random variables (albeit discrete ones), just like
parameters. Hence, posterior simulators drawing from model space (i.e. the posterior dis-
tributions of the models) can be derived for both, single regressors and complete models.
These algorithms do not need to evaluate every model, but rather focus on the models of
high PMP.
The most common MC3 algorithm is based on a Random Walk Chain Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm which draws candidate models from regions of the model space in the neigh-
borhood of the current draw and then accepts them with a certain probability. Posterior
results based on the sequence of models generated from the MC3 algorithm can be calcu-
lated by averaging over the draws. As with other Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithms,
a starting value for the chain must be chosen and a reasonable number of burn-in replica-
tions should be discarded to eliminate the eﬀects of this choice.
It is important to verify convergence of the algorithm and to estimate the accuracy of
approximations such as the posterior mean. FLS (2001b) suggest a simple way of doing
this: based on a reduced set of models, for example every model visited by the MC3
algorithm, they calculate the PMP ﬁrst analytically and then using the algorithm. If
the algorithm has converged, then these two ways should yield the same results. The
relationship between the analytical and MC3 results give an idea of approximation error
and simple diagnostics can be constructed to check for convergence. For instance, FLS
(2001b) suggest calculating the correlation between the analytical and MC3 PMPs and
taking enough replications to ensure this correlation lies above 0.99.
4.4 Econometric Issues and Speciﬁcation Tests
Before performing the BMA we had to consider a number of econometric problems po-
tentially arising in panel data growth regressions. Hence, we performed various tests and
simple Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) panel estimations before doing the actual
BMA.
In the case of developing countries one has to face the fact that several growth factors like
educational attainment rates, infrastructure variables and institutional factors are steadily
Bayes factor obtained in (3) has a built-in mechanism to avoid overﬁtting. Brock and Durlauf (2001) and
Brock et al. (2003) raise objections against uniform priors on the model space because of the assumption
that the probability that one regressor should appear in a growth model is independent of the inclusion
of others. Some regressors are similar to others whereas others are not and, therefore, they suggest a tree
structure to organize model uncertainty in linear regression models. Hoeting et al. (1999), however, state
that when there is little prior information about the relative plausibility of each model, the assumption
that all models are equally likely a priori is a reasonable “neutral” choice.
15increasing over time. Therefore, one has to consider the possibility that the data contains
unit roots and has to perform unit root tests. First, we used the Levin/Lin/Chu panel
unit root test that considers the ADF speciﬁcation




itδ + εit (10)
where α is common, the lag order pi of the diﬀerence term can vary across cross-sections
and H0 : α = 0. Second, we used the Im/Pesaran/Shin unit root test that permits not
only the pi to vary across cross sections but to estimate the above equation for each cross
section. The null hypothesis is H0 : α = 0. The average t-statistic of the individually
estimated αi is taken.
According to these unit root tests all education variables contain unit roots. This also is
manifested in bad Durbin Watson statistics when we took the level series in the LSDV
panel estimates. Therefore, we do not take the level of educational attainment rates but
their change. This turns out to remove the error autocorrelation and these series no longer
contain unit roots. Further we ﬁnd unit roots in the GDP shares of agriculture and industry
reﬂecting the process of sectoral change. Taking the change of GDP shares, we ﬁnd no
unit roots. The share of agricultural and manufacturing exports in total merchandize
exports contains unit roots but not the share of ores exports. Thus, we take the change
in agricultural and manufacturing export shares. All infrastructure variables except for
the electricity distribution and transmission output loss contain unit roots, which is why
we take the change or growth of infrastructure, sometimes averaged over 3 years. As
the stocks of FDI grew drastically in the 1990s, this variable proved to contain unit roots.
Therefore, we take the change of FDI stocks. Finally, we see that all institutional variables
contain unit roots.
Taking a number of diﬀerenced series in the estimations we need to be aware of the
economic interpretation of the coeﬃcients. For example, we test whether a higher or lower
increase of the FDI share has a positive eﬀect on growth or whether a more rapid increase
of tertiary education is good for growth.
The use of interaction terms has recently appeared in empirical growth research. If the
regression is
Y = β0 + β1X + β2Z + ε (11)
then the regression with an interaction term is
Y = β0 + β1X + β2Z + β3XZ + ε (12)
The idea is that the impact of a growth regressor is often depending on the simultaneous
level of other economic indicators. β3 is interpreted as the amount of change in the slope
16of the regression when Z changes by one unit. Equation (12) can be reformulated as
Y = (β1 + β3Z)X + (β0 + β2Z) + ε (13)
For examining the interaction, one then has to choose particular values for Z, e.g. the
mean, or the standard deviation below and above. One can then compute the reaction of
Y to X for given values of Z.
In the context of analyzing the growth impact of FDI, Borensztein et al. (1998) use in-
teraction with human capital and ﬁnd that the eﬀect of FDI depends on the availability
of human capital. Calder´ on et al. (2004) examine the growth impact of openness con-
ditioning with interaction terms on GDP p.c. levels and ﬁnd that the impact is zero for
low levels of income. Chang et al. (2005) use interaction terms to show that the impact
of openness on growth depends on structural characteristics such as education, ﬁnancial
depth, inﬂation stabilization, public infrastructure, governance, etc.
When using interaction terms, one has also to include the main variables even if not signif-
icant. Friedrich (1982) points out that otherwise the interaction eﬀect and the main eﬀects
get confounded. Furthermore, if the main eﬀect is not included, changes in the zero point
of the original variables can result in important changes in the eﬀects of the interaction
terms. Using the interaction terms and the main variables may result in multicollinearity.
Therefore, some authors use quadratic interaction terms, e.g. Calder´ on et al. (2004). Since
BMA is capable of handling highly collinear regressors, we use simple products as inter-
action terms. The algorithm appropriately weights the information added to a regression
from two collinear variables: the Markov Chain will not visit models containing regressors
that are collinear to those already included as there is no additional information provided
in such a model. In fact, the algorithm avoids such models and assigns high PMPs only
to models not characterized by this problem (Masanjala and Papageorgiou 2004, Milani
2003). Evidently, series containing unit roots enter the interaction terms in diﬀerences.
Another issue arising with a growth regression for a group of countries situated on the same
continent is the possibility of spatial dependency. This issue has been increasingly raised
in the context of growth econometrics. To settle this issue, we performed Moran’s I tests
on the dependent variable and the errors of a panel estimate of equation (1) containing all
variables except the interaction terms. As spatial weighting matrix the contiguity matrix
was used. The results indicate that there is no reason to assume spatial dependencies
among Latin American countries. The reason may be that there are not strong enough
trade and ﬁnancial relations between the Latin American countries but that LA countries
are more oriented towards the US economy.
Endogeneity of regressors, i.e. simultaneity or reverse causality, constitutes a serious prob-
lem of growth regressions. A number of regressors in growth regressions such as education
17and investment and maybe political parameters are likely to be simultaneously determined
with growth. This leads to biased estimates in normal OLS regressions. However, it is
generally diﬃcult to ﬁnd suitable instruments, variables that are correlated with the ex-
planatory variable X but not with the error term. One possibility that circumvents this
problem is to use lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments. GMM esti-
mators for dynamic panel data models use lagged diﬀerences or levels of the variable as
instruments as proposed by Arellano/Bond (1991) (GMM diﬀerence estimator) and Blun-
dell/Bond (1997) (GMM systems estimator). However, this approach does not permit full
endogeneity, but assumes that the explanatory variable is not correlated with future error
terms. A Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions is commonly used to test the validity
of instruments (Chang et al. 2005). Consequently, the consistency of any instrumental
variable estimation critically depends on the validity of instruments.
Among our regressors are several variables that are blamed to be endogenous in the lit-
erature. First, human capital is often considered to be simultaneously determined with
growth (Temple 2001). However, this should apply rather to educational enrolment rates
than to attainment rates which change only after the degree has been gained and when
the person becomes part of the adult population (attainment rates refer to the adult pop-
ulation). It is debateable whether changes in infrastructure, the indicator we use, can
cause endogeneity problems. However, as any investment, infrastructure investment will
lag growth, being only realized when the economy has already experienced higher growth
in the previous period. One can also argue that governments may raise infrastructure
investment anti-cyclically to stimulate growth. Since the CPI has to be considered to be
endogenous, we take the volatility of the consumer price index.
In the context of institutional factors one can also hypothesize that institutions may be
endogenous to growth. It may be a favorable growth climate that leads to better institu-
tions, so the causality may run in both directions from institutions to growth and from
growth to institutions. But should we really believe that higher growth leads to better
bureaucracy or less corruption? The example of China would suggest that this is not the
case. Also, it seems more likely that the development of institutions has something to
do with the income level and not with growth. Svensson (2005) found a strong negative
relationship between income and corruption for a sample of some 80 countries using vari-
ous measures of corruption. Dawson (2003) performed Granger causality test between the
institutional variables of the Fraser Institute and growth on a large number of countries
and found strong support that institutions actually cause growth. We follow this view and
assume that our institutional variables are not endogenous.
Finally, applying panel data estimation it is also important to consider the possibility of
18parameter heterogeneity as pointed out by Hsiao and Pesaran (2004). Having to consider
the limited degrees of freedom given by the sample size (n=17, t =19) and the high number
of variables, including the interaction terms (kmax=61), we had to refrain from permitting
full parameter heterogeneity. However, we consider the possibility of coeﬃcient variation
for diﬀerent subgroups of LA and account for this with slope dummy variables. The con-
sidered subgroups are the large economies ”D1”, the rich economies ”D2” and the South
American economies ”D3”. Their likely contribution was tested in exploratory LSDV panel
estimates since the number of heterogeneous coeﬃcients had to be kept low in order to
save degrees of freedom.
Evidently, one should also consider the possibility of structural breaks in time. However,
since the full data set with all regressors starts only in 1985, it was not possible to consider
a likely structural break around 1990.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Posterior probabilities
All our results are based on taking 2 million draws and discarding the ﬁrst 500,000 as
burn-in replications. As a test for convergence of the algorithm and a diagnostic check
that the model performance is satisfactory, we checked the correlation coeﬃcient between
visit frequencies and posterior probabilities which lies above the recommended threshold
of 0.99 for the two BMAs.
Dealing ﬁrstly with the inherent model uncertainty and with the signiﬁcance of combi-
nations of regressors, we report the PMPs for the ten best models of the two BMAs and
their respective regressors in Tables A.2.2 and A.2.4 in the appendix. The ten best mod-
els’ posterior probabilities are quite spread between and within our two samples. Also the
cumulative PMP, which is the numerical probability of the top 10 models out of the total
number of models, varies a lot between our two samples. In the ﬁrst sample with total
FDI it accounts for 9.2 per cent of the total posterior mass, whereas it is as high as 25
per cent for our second BMA with distinguished EU- and NA-FDI. This can been seen
as an indicator for the fact that disaggregated FDI reveals much more information in our
growth regression than does total FDI. An indicator for that is also the high PMP of the
most important model in the second BMA, which is 40.8 per cent, whereas the PMP of
the most important model in the ﬁrst BMA with total FDI is only 16.2 per cent. All our
PMPs, however, are high compared to other BMA studies of economic growth in which
the PMP of the most important model sometimes is only between 1 and 5 per cent, thus,
19resembling the PMP of only our tenth best model or being even lower than that.11
Looking secondly at the importance of single regressors in aﬀecting growth, the second
columns of Tables A.2.3 and A.2.5 in the appendix report the BMA posterior probability
(or probability of inclusion) for each of the explanatory variables in our two BMAs. It can
be interpreted as the probability that the respective regressor should be included in the
evaluation as it exerts some inﬂuence on the dependent variable regardless of which other
explanatory variables are included as well. We ranked the variables according to their
probability of inclusion and will discuss their respective eﬀects in the next section. As
there is no theoretical justiﬁcation for any threshold of posterior probabilities over which
to call a regressor ’very important’, we base our discussion on the number of regressors
that has been identiﬁed as the mean number in each of our BMAs. In the second sample
with disaggregated FDI the mean number was six whereas the mean number of regressors
of 7.2 in the ﬁrst BMA with total FDI reproduces exactly the suggested number of at
least seven regressors in growth regressions (Sala-i-Martin 1997). Furthermore, we discuss
the regressors used in one of the ten best models (but which do not exert a high posterior
probability themselves).
5.2 Discussion and policy implications
When assessing the impact of total FDI (see Tables A.2.3 and A.2.4) in 17 LA countries in
the period 1985-2003, our ﬁrst BMA indicates that institutional and infrastructure factors
show a high posterior probability. The mean coeﬃcients signs indicate that countries with
decreasing political risk and internal conﬂict and with more democratic accountability
enjoyed higher growth. The sign of military involvement in politics is negative, indicating
military involvement did not harm growth. Among infrastructure variables, the change
of telephone mainlines, of electricity power capacity and of road density are variables
with high posterior probability. This indicates that an improvement in infrastructure en-
dowments, which is a critical point in LA, was important for growth. Among education
variables, only tertiary level attainment rates show a high probability as regressors. The
increase in tertiary level education attainment rates, however, was negatively related with
growth. Nevertheless, in the big economies tertiary education attainment was positively
associated with growth. FDI per se is negatively related to growth, but not if condi-
tioned on tertiary education and the development of the legal system. Finally, in the rich
economies a high level of external debt had a negative eﬀect on growth.
As our intention was to investigate the likely diﬀerent impact of NA-FDI compared to
steeply growing EU-FDI, we ran a separate BMA in which we distinguish between the two
11See, for example, FLS 2001a; Masanjala and Papageorgiou 2004.
20sources of FDI. Due to data constraints the time span of this sample is only 1990-2003.
We now ﬁnd (see Tables A.2.5 and A.2.6) that the infrastructure variables ROAD and
PHONE are among the regressors with high posterior probability. Our previous results
are conﬁrmed that tertiary education is an important regressor having unfortunately a
negative coeﬃcient. The coeﬃcient becomes positive only in the large economies. In
addition, the improvement of primary education attainment enters with a positive coeﬃ-
cient as a regressor in the 10 best models. EU-FDI enters at an important place with a
positive coeﬃcient if conditioned on an improvement of institutional features. The inter-
action terms with LAW, POLRI and DEMO have a high probability and positive sign. In
addition, we can ﬁnd EU-FDI in interaction with electricity capacity among the 10 best
models with a positive coeﬃcient. NA-FDI cannot be found among the regressors with a
high probability or among the 10 best models.
How can we explain our regression results that European investment contributes to growth
in LA while NA-FDI has no important inﬂuence? Let us recall our hypotheses on the likeli-
ness of productivity eﬀects in the host economy depending on the type of FDI, the distance
of the source country, the trade regime and the sector of investment. To what extent can
this help us to explain diﬀerent the performance of NA versus EU-FDI? What is the respec-
tive situation in LA? First, statistical evidence suggests that NA-FDI largely has taken
the form of greenﬁeld investment while EU-FDI rests to a large extent on acquisitions
(Javorcik and Spatareanu 2006). Therefore, EU-FDI would establish more linkages with
local industries and produce more productivity spillovers. Second, we have to acknowledge
that a large share of NA-FDI takes place in the context of the free trade agreements of
NAFTA and CAFTA in Central America. These arrangements favor vertical FDI of NA
ﬁrms where some stage in the production is located in Central America to beneﬁt from
cheap labor costs. All intermediaries are easily imported from the close NA ﬁrm under
the free trade regime and ﬁnal products are then exported again into NA. This type of
maquila industry is widespread in NA-FDI in Mexico and other Central American coun-
tries in the machinery and electronics industry (Gomez Vega 2004; Lindegaard and Leiner
2003). Clearly, these ﬁrms do not establish any linkages with local ﬁrms and thus produc-
tivity spillovers will not arise. The literature on the maquila industry (Puyana Mutis et al.
2005; Gomez Vega 2004), concluding that its growth eﬀect was disappointing, supports
this reasoning. In contrast, the distance between EU-FDI in Latin America is too far
and the free trade agreements between LA countries and the EU are still too limited to
support vertical FDI. Hence EU-FDI contains a larger share of market seeking, horizontal
FDI than NA-FDI. This implies that European ﬁrms locate entire productions in LA and
establish linkages with local suppliers. As a result, we should expect that EU-FDI makes
21a contribution to aggregate productivity growth.
In order to learn more about the structure of NA-FDI and EU-FDI, we compiled informa-
tion on the largest foreign aﬃliates as provided by UNCTAD for each LA country. This
source indicates the industries of investment and reports its source country, as well as
the number of sales and employees in the aﬃliates in 2002. Compiling this information
(see Figure 6 in the appendix) reveals some interesting facts on the structure of NA-FDI
and EU-FDI. First, we see that the number of European aﬃliates in South America is
almost twice as large as that of NA aﬃliates. Given that the size of EU-FDI does not
drastically exceed NA-FDI European investments in South America evidently comprises a
larger network of ﬁrms than North American ones. In Central America, on the contrary,
where the level of NA-FDI is larger than that from Europe, the number of European aﬃl-
iates accounts for 70 per cent of the number of NA-ﬁrms. Hence the network of European
ﬁrms is not larger in Central America. Generally, the size of Europe aﬃliates is smaller
than that of North American aﬃliates, with the exception of FDI in Argentina and Brazil
where the average size of aﬃliates is equal and in Mexico, where just 2 large German car
producers are operating.
Calculating the Theil index of sales/employment in diverse industries as a measure of sec-
toral concentration in manufacturing, we ﬁnd that European aﬃliates mostly operate in
a wider set of industries in South America than NA ones, except for Venezuela where a
number of European ﬁrms operate only in the rubber sector. In Central America, however,
the reverse is true. The concentration of NA-aﬃliates is less than the European. The much
lower stock of EU-FDI than that of NA can explain the concentration in a few sectors.
Compared to the concentration of EU-FDI in South America, the concentration of NA-
FDI in Central America is still high. (Very interesting is the case of Guatemala where all
brands of US cosmetics are produced. The EU produces pharmaceutical products there).
Given the larger number of European ﬁrms in South America, their smaller size and their
sectoral diversity it would be clear that they are more likely to establish local linkages and
EU-FDI would consequently have a signiﬁcant productivity eﬀect. In contrast, we would
expect that few companies in a narrow range of industries would provide fewer linkages
with the productive fabric of a country. NA-FDI would, therefore, have less productivity
eﬀects in South America. In Central America, the relatively high concentration of a sub-
stantial FDI stock of NA companies would reduce productivity spillovers. Consequently,
EU-FDI would make a larger growth contribution in LA than NA-FDI. Finally, as our
compilation on foreign aﬃliates shows, it is striking that the share of FDI placed in the
service sector is almost always larger with EU- than with NA-FDI. In some cases as in
Chile, Venezuela and El Salvador the share of service sector FDI is signiﬁcantly higher
22with EU-FDI. This is largely the result of the activity of European ﬁrms in telecommuni-
cation networks, but also in the supply of gas, water and electricity. In banking the size of
activity of European ﬁrms and the number of their aﬃliates is larger than with NA-FDI.
As in Arnold et al. (2006) who stressed the importance of service sector FDI in the Czech
economy for productivity growth, we should expect that EU-FDI in the LA service sector
has modernized the infrastructure in the service sector and increased its capacity. Local
industries should beneﬁt from this improved infrastructure and become more productive
as a consequence. Consequently, EU-FDI will also have a larger eﬀect on productivity
growth in LA than NA-FDI because of its larger activity in the service sector.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the growth eﬀects of FDI in 17 LA countries conditional on macroe-
conomic, institutional, structural and infrastructure factors and on education. Examining
the period 1985-2003, we ﬁrst analyze the eﬀects of aggregated FDI inﬂows and then dis-
tinguish between EU- and NA-FDI. In doing so we account for the major shifts in the
regional composition of these inﬂows since the 1990s and for the varying types and mo-
tives of FDI coming from the EU as opposed to coming from NA. We allow for country
speciﬁc eﬀects in our panel data model and look at group speciﬁc coeﬃcients addressing
potential parameter heterogeneity within the LA countries.
The method we propose in this context is BMA as it is a suitable way to account for
model uncertainty in growth regressions and to ascertain the most robust regressors given
the myriad of possible model speciﬁcations.12 From more than 50 potential growth de-
terminants we identify not only the parameter combinations of the best models – which
can be seen as the most relevant ‘policy packages’ for stimulating FDI-led growth in LA –
but also a ranking of all included regressors according to their respective importance for
growth.
Consequently, our ﬁndings entail new insights in the conﬂicting results on the growth im-
pact of FDI in LA in two respects: We are in the position to suggest a growth model that
is highly reliable to describe the growth eﬀects and the impact of FDI in LA as it was
selected ‘conditional on model uncertainty’. Furthermore, our paper provides a kind of
‘external robustness check’ for related studies. Concerning the latter, we can conﬁrm the
results of previous studies on the importance of certain institutional and infrastructure
factors for growth but we have to reject the ﬁndings of other studies on the inﬂuence of
macroeconomic factors, structural change and human capital in general in LA. The models
12This is shown here and elsewhere; see, for example, the discussion in chapter 1 and 4.1.
23selected in our two BMA provide robust conditions conjecturing that FDI in general as
well as EU-FDI is good for productivity growth in LA but also that LA can mostly beneﬁt
from FDI if the political and institutional settings reduce political risk and improve law
and order. Another prerequisite for positive eﬀects of FDI is that these countries invest
heavily in their infrastructure. Developing a qualiﬁed human capital base, in particular
on the level of higher education, is another requirement for LA to beneﬁt from FDI. As
we ﬁnd no robust inﬂuence of NA-FDI, we would suggest the region to focus more on
horizontal, market-seeking FDI – possibly coming from European countries – instead of
trying to attract eﬃciency seeking, vertical FDI which is the type usually focused on in
North American countries.
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Figure 1: Total FDI as share of GDP
30Figure 2: EU-FDI as share of GDP
31Figure 3: NA-FDI as share of GDP
32Figure 4: EU- vs. NA-FDI across period
33Figure 5: EU- vs. NA-FDI across countries
34Figure 6: Structural characteristics of EU-FDI and NA-FDI in LA (based on largest foreign
aﬃliates**)
Source: Own calculation based on UNCTAD; ** all calculations are based on sales in
Million US-Dollars of aﬃliates unless with * where the number of employees are consid-
ered. The Theil index considers concentration in 14 industries of primary production and
manufacturing. The Theil index runs from 0 (equal distribution on all industries) to 2.63
(concentration on one industry)
35A.2 Tables
A.2.1 Variables and Data Sources
Variable Deﬁnition Source Remarks
GROWTHLF Share of real GDP growth per
labour force
WDI 2005 Constant US-Dollars in 2000
GFCF Share of gross ﬁxed capital
formation in GDP
WDI 2005 Lagged value of t-1
FDIT Change share total FDI stock
in GDP
UNCTAD
FDIEU Change share FDI stock from
EU in GDP
UNCTAD Generated from inward stocks of LA
data by country of origin. Data
completed with data from OECD in-
ternational investment directory for
European countries, FDI stock data
from EU, NA and LA central banks
and statistical oﬃces
FDIUS Change share FDI stock from
NA in GDP
UNCTAD See FDIEU
LIT Change of literacy rate WDI 2005
PRIM Change share of adult pop-
ulation with completed pri-
mary education
Barro/Lee Missing years own calculations
SEC Change share of adult pop-
ulation with completed sec-
ondary education
Barro/Lee Missing years own calculations
TERT Change share of adult pop-
ulation with completed ter-
tiary education
Barro/Lee Missing years own calculations
CPIV OL Consumer price volatility IFS Standard deviation of per cent
changes, quarterly data of past 5
years
EXCH Exchange rate volatility IFS Calculated from oﬃcial exchange
rate national currency per US-
Dollar, quarterly data of past 5 years
DEBT Share external debt to ex-
ports
WDI 2005
36Variable Deﬁnition Source Remarks
URBAN Urban population growth WDI 2005
AGRI Change GDP share agricul-
ture
WDI 2005
IND Change GDP share industry WDI 2005
EXAGRI Change share agricultural ex-
ports in merchandize exports
WDI 2005
EXORES Share ores and metals in mer-
chandize exports
WDI 2005
EXMAN Change share manufacturing
in merchandize exports
WDI 2005
PHONE Growth telephone mainlines
per 1000s
WDI 2005
ELEC1 Growth electricity generating
capacity per 1000 persons
WDI 2005 3 year moving averages
ELEC2 Electric power transmission
and distribution loss, share of
output
WDI 2005




3 year moving averages
AIR Change of aircraft departures
per 100s (in logs)
WDI 2005
BURO Change bureaucratic quality
index (in logs)
ICRG Improvement indicates better bu-
reaucracy, index runs from 0 to 1.4
CORR Change corruption index (in
logs)
ICRG Improvement indicates less corrup-
tion, index runs from 0 to 1.8
DEMO Change index democratic ac-
countability (in logs)
ICRG Improvement indicates more democ-
racy, index runs from 0 index runs
from 0 to 1.8
GOV Change index government
stability (in logs)
ICRG Improvement indicates more stabil-
ity, index runs from 0 to 2.5
CONFL Change index internal con-
ﬂict (in logs)
ICRG Improvement indicates less conﬂict,
index runs from 0 to 2.5
LAW Change index law and order
(in logs)
ICRG Improvement indicates better law,
index runs from 0 to 1.8
37Variable Deﬁnition Source Remarks
MILI Change index military in pol-
itics (in logs)
ICRG Improvement indicates less military,
index runs from 0 to 1.8
POLRI Change index political risk
(in logs)
ICRG Improvement of index indicates less
risk, index runs from 0 to 4.6
FDIT ∗ LIT Interaction term
FDIT ∗ PRIM Interaction term
FDIT ∗ SEC Interaction term
FDIT ∗ TERT Interaction term
FDIT ∗PHONE Interaction term
FDIT ∗ ELEC1 Interaction term
FDIT ∗ ELEC2 Interaction term
FDIT ∗ ROAD Interaction term
FDIT ∗ EXAGRI Interaction term
FDIT ∗EXORES Interaction term
FDIT ∗ EXMAN Interaction term
FDIT ∗ BURO Interaction term
FDIT ∗ DEMO Interaction term
FDIT ∗ CORR Interaction term
FDIT ∗ LAW Interaction term
FDIT ∗ GOV Interaction term
FDIT ∗ CONFL Interaction term
FDIT ∗ MILI Interaction term
FDIT ∗ POLRI Interaction term
D1 Dummy for big economies ob-
tained from ranking GDP in
2000 US-Dollars in 1980 and
1990
Arg, Bra, Chi , Col, Mex, Per, Uru,
Ven (no change of group members
between years)
D2 Dummy for high income
countries obtained from rank-
ing GDP p.c. in 2000 US-
Dollars in 1980 and 1990
Arg, Bra, Chi, Costa, Mex, Pan,
Uru, Ven (no change of group mem-
bers between years)
D3 Dummy for South America
38A.2.2 Total FDI-growth BMA in 17 LA countries 1985-2003: Regressors and
PMP of ten best models
Model Regressors PMP (in per cent)
1 FDIT, FDIT*TERT, MILI, D2*DEBT, ROAD, FDIT*LAW 16.17
2 FDIT, FDIT*TERT, PHONE, MILI, FDIT*LAW 15.56
3 FDIT, FDIT*TERT, MILI, D2*DEBT, FDIT*LAW 15.23
4 FDIT, FDIT*TERT, MILI, FDIT*LAW 10.91
5 FDIT, FDIT*TERT, MILI, D2*DEBT, PHONE, ROAD, FDIT*LAW 8.44
6 FDIT, FDIT*TERT, MILI, D2*DEBT, PHONE, FDIT*LAW 8.16
7 FDIT*TERT, MILI, POLRI, FDIT*LAW 7.21
8 MILI, POLRI, FDIT*LAW 6.98
9 MILI, D2*DEBT, ROAD, FDIT*LAW 6.06
10 MILI, D2*DEBT, FDIT*LAW 5.27
A.2.3 Total FDI-growth BMA 17 LAC 1985-2003: Regressors’ posterior prob-
abilities and posterior means
Importance Regressor Posterior probability Posterior Mean
1 FDIT*LAW 0.997 3.2171
2 MILI 0.8995 -0.0625
3 FDIT*TERT 0.7055 158.5842
4 FDIT 0.5176 -0.2753
5 D2*DEBT 0.5067 -0.0068
6 ROAD 0.3899 1.7996
7 PHONE 0.3190 0.0314
8 POLRI 0.2217 0.0483
9 ELEC1 0.1705 0.0150
10 CONFL 0.1475 0.0061
11 TERT 0.1418 -1.643
12 DEMO 0.1389 0.0073
13 FDIT*MILI 0.087 0.0643
14 D1*TERT 0.076 1.2275
15 GFCF 0.0526 0.0065
16 FDIT*PHONE 0.051 0.0706
17 FDIT*POLRI 0.0457 0.1314
18 URBAN 0.0435 0.0493
19 FDIT*LIT 0.0386 -1.5704
39Importance Regressor Posterior probability Posterior Mean
20 LIT 0.0317 -0.2024
21 FDIT*ELEC2 0.0301 0.0010
22 D1*LIT 0.0298 0.2466
23 FDIT*GOV 0.0294 0.0152
24 D3*URBAN 0.0293 0.0345
25 EXCH 0.0291 0.000
26 EXORES 0.0283 0.0025
27 FDIT*ROAD 0.0277 -0.8102
28 FDIT*BURO 0.027 0.0178
29 BURO 0.0264 0.0005
30 PRIM 0.0262 0.0132
31 FDIT*CONFL 0.0254 0.0115
32 FDIT*SEC 0.0252 0.2376
33 AIR 0.0246 0.0002
34 FDIT*DEMO 0.0230 -0.0163
35 EXAGRI 0.0207 0.0015
36 IND 0.0203 -0.0016
37 FDIT*EXORES 0.0201 0.0023
38 CORR 0.0196 -0.0003
39 GOV 0.0195 -0.0001
40 FDIT*PRIM 0.019 0.1575
41 FDIT*ELEC1 0.0183 -0.0142
42 LAW 0.0172 0.0003
43 DEBT 0.0168 0.0000
44 AGRI 0.0167 -0.0010
45 SEC 0.0166 -0.0028
46 FDIT*CORR 0.0164 0.0009
47 FDIT 0.0160 -0.0001
48 FDIT*FDIT 0.0155 0.0026
49 ELEC2 0.0149 -0.0002
50 CPIV OL 0.0147 0.0000
51 FDIT*EXORES 0.0146 -0.0202
40A.2.4 Disaggregated FDI-growth BMA in 17 LA countries 1990-2003: Re-
gressors and PMP of ten best models
Model Regressors PMP (in per cent)
1 TERT, D1*TERT, PHONE, FDIEU*LAW 40.81
2 TERT, D1*TERT, FDIEU*LAW 21.54
3 TERT, D1*TERT, PHONE, ROAD, FDIEU*LAW 12.20
4 TERT, D1*TERT, ROAD, FDIEU*LAW 7.11
5 PHONE, FDIEU*LAW 4.38
6 FDIEU*LAW 3.21
7 TERT, D1*TERT, EXAGRI, PHONE, FDIEU*LAW 2.79
8 TERT, D1*TERT, PHONE, FDIEU*LAW, FDIEU*ELEC1 2.83
9 TERT, D1*TERT, PHONE, FDIEU*DEMO, FDIEU*LAW 2.65
10 PRIM, TERT, D1*TERT, PHONE, FDIEU*LAW 2.48
A.2.5 Disaggregated FDI - growth BMA 17 LAC 1990-2003: Regressors’
posterior probabilities and posterior means
Importance Regressor Posterior probability Posterior Mean
1 FDIEU*LAW 0.9341 7.3443
2 TERT 0.8264 -33.4809
3 D1*TERT 0.8060 32.4102
4 PHONE 0.6522 0.0689
5 ROAD 0.2301 0.9039
6 FDIEU*POLRI 0.1176 1.5728
7 MILI 0.1008 -0.0047
8 FDIUS*MILI 0.085 0.0821
9 FDIEU*DEMO 0.0713 -0.5047
10 PRIM 0.0665 0.0882
11 FDIEU*ELEC1 0.0654 -0.5389
12 EXAGRI 0.0599 0.0111
13 POLRI 0.0508 0.0065
14 FDIUS*LAW 0.0466 0.0738
15 FDIEU 0.0463 -0.019
16 LIT 0.0414 -0.3607
17 D2*EXAGRI 0.0395 -0.0137
18 EXCH 0.0303 0.0001
19 FDIUS*CONFL 0.0268 -0.0095
41Importance Regressor Posterior probability Posterior Mean
20 SEC 0.0257 0.0096
21 FDIEU*SEC 0.0227 -0.6821
22 FDIEU*MILI 0.0223 0.0346
23 FDIEU*ELEC2 0.0211 -0.0175
24 FDIEU*ROAD 0.0208 1.4167
25 GFCF 0.0207 -0.0015
26 CONFL 0.0197 0.0003
27 FDIEU*TERT 0.0190 0.8342
28 FDIUS*DEMO 0.0189 0.0034
28 FDIEU*PRIM 0.0184 0.4764
29 DEMO 0.0183 -0.0004
30 FDIEU*BURO 0.0174 0.0296
31 FDIUS*SEC 0.0174 -0.0686
32 FDIUS*PRIM 0.0172 0.1074
33 FDIUS*GOV 0.0171 -0.0016
34 ELEC1 0.017 0.0009
35 FDIUS 0.0165 -0.0003
36 CPIV OL 0.0165 0.0000
37 FDIEU*PHONE 0.0164 -0.0193
38 FDIUS*BURO 0.0162 -0.001
39 FDIUS*PHONE 0.016 -0.001
40 ELEC2 0.0157 -0.0006
41 FDIEU*CONFL 0.0156 0.0069
42 FDIUS*ELEC2 0.0156 0.0004
43 BURO 0.0155 0.0001
44 AIR 0.0152 0.0001
45 GOV 0.0152 0.0000
46 FDIEU*GOV 0.0149 -0.0034
47 FDIUS*TERT 0.0148 0.1823
48 EXORES 0.0146 0.0005
49 EXMANUF 0.0145 0.0002
50 FDIUS*ELEC1 0.0145 0.0033
51 URBAN 0.0142 -0.0027
52 FDIEU*CORR 0.014 -0.0043
53 FDIUS*POLRI 0.0138 -0.0024
42Importance Regressor Posterior probability Posterior Mean
54 AGRI 0.0135 0.0004
55 CORR 0.0133 -0.0001
56 LAW 0.0130 0.0001
57 IND 0.0128 -0.0007
58 DEBT 0.0125 0.0000
59 FDIUS*ROAD 0.0125 -0.0285
60 FDIUS*CORR 0.0121 0.0008
43